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ABSTRACT 
111c AK Party's chronic 'political 
insecurity' may have passed a threshold 
as the ruling party resurfaces as an 
actor taking advantage of its pro­
European Union sentiments to begin 
a 'grand negotiation' with Turkey's 
thus-far publicly shunned Kurdish 
leaders after decades of bloodshed. This 
new window of opportunity could not 
have emerged without the explosion 
of the Ergenekon incident, which has 
offered a persuasive critique of the 
closed, dark, intolerant and secret 
communities friendly with the military 
bureaucracy and state officials but 
insidiously devoted to destroying the 
government. In the post-Ergenekon era, 
the new democratic opening represents 
a significant departure from a military 
solution to the Kurdish issue which 
has blocked civilian imaginations by 
declaring the Kurdish identity demands 
as a security threat to the officially 
proscribed Turkish identity. The real 
issue at stake now for the AK Party 
government is a redefinition of the 
locus and space where the phenomenon 
of real political power takes place in 
Turkey. 
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All Turkish governments have been 
historically presented with hard 
choices in launching democratization strate­
gies; such attempts always risk shattering the 
existing balance of power which favors the po­
litical role of the military as the· leading force of 
an establishment that may react to democratic 
reforms. Fearing the risks of a showdown with 
the military, Turkish governments have, more 
often than not, chosen not to challenge the 
conditions of military prominence in politics 
without very strong domestic and internation­
al backing. The lack of serious reaction from 
international actors in regard to Turkey's in­
ternal military interventions has played a role 
in further emboldening these forces within 
Turkey, and continues to normalize the utili­
zation of extreme measures. The political class 
has found it more worthwhile to guard itself 
against a potential showdown with the military 
by building up a power base for itself while in 
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The 'military solution' to the 
Kurdish question has been 
responsible for the decline of 
democratic discourse and its 
replacement by repackaged 
conservative nationalist 
reactionism 
power. That is, it has opted for doling out 
benefits as part of the system of paying 
and receiving political payoffs from the 
rent-seeking networks. 
Not unlike the governments of all 
colors preceding itself, but more so be­
cause it has been perceived as a threat to 
the secular establishment from day one, 
the AK Party (Justice and Development) 
government has also been presented with difficult choices in determining the 
tradeoffs between security in office and democracy. Like its predecessor govern­
ments, the AK Party implicitly accepts that the "code" of being in power is to avoid 
conflict with the strong secular bloc which is led by the military. Indeed, the bloc 
forged new partnerships against the AK Party with the segments of the judiciary 
dealing with regime issues (including public prosecutors and the constitutional 
court); with the high echelons of the civilian bureaucracy; and with significant 
sectors of Turkish secular civil society. With the AK Party's victories in a total of 
five consecutive local, general and presidential elections since 2002 , the security­
conscious establishment has stepped up its ideologically and emotionally-charged 
efforts to portray the ruling party's postures and policies as endangering the re­
gime's 'secular' character. 
Over the past few years, this situation has brought out the ruling party's system­
supportive, conservative and nationalist streaks, which leave no room for launch­
ing a new liberal and civilianeinitiated constitution that would seek to protect all 
of its citizens from the state. Democratizing Turkey's party system and its election 
laws and brokering a democratic peace in the southeast were components of the 
AK Party's reform repertoire that have thus, so far, failed to materialize. In fact, 
until very recently, the party appeared to have abandoned these aspirations. 
Toward the end of its first term in office, the ruling party went with the flow 
of "street nationalism;" converged with the military perspective on the Kurdish 
question, and failed to consider a more open-minded approach to the Kurdish 
issue as part of its agenda. The opportunity created by the capture of PKK terror­
ist leader Ocalan never turned into a process of peace and resolution; rather, the 
military acquired an increasingly influential voice in the political calculations of 
Ankara and the vitality of the EU bid slipped. As the violence escalated, increased 
military casualties in the early years of this century have caused many to question 
the military's motivations and strategies in its fight against the Kurdish separatists. 
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Nevertheless, aided by the fact that despite unilateral ceasefires, the PKK did not 
give up the armed struggle or surrender, and abetted by a media that shored up 
the army's martyr ideology, which promotes dying for one's country as a citizen's 
highest duty, the 'military solution' to the PKK issue has almost turned into a 
common-sense discourse. 
The Oxymoron of 'Military Solution' 
The 1990s were instrumental in the formation of a 'military solution' to the 
Kurdish issue which has blocked civilian imaginations: refusing to discuss the 
legitimacy of identities other than the officially proscribed Turkish one, the secu­
rity-minded secular establishment has invested considerable energy throughout 
this decade to establish Kurdish nationalism and Islamic challenges as the sole 
emphases of internal security threats. Moreover, the establishment has insisted 
that these challenges be addressed through emergency military measures rather 
than through parliamentary decisions, governmental policies and civilian wis­
dom. Thus, purely political problems have been brought within a national secu­
rity framework; in other words, military functions became politicized and civilian 
politics became securitized. Security ceased to be discussed through interagency 
dialogue between civilian and military institutions that might have reinforced 
and counterbalanced each other's authority. On the contrary, the establishment's 
single-minded concern for securing the country against threats originating from 
Islamic activism and Kurdish nationalism has led to a stifled public debate on 
key issues, as all political persuasions have adopted a new form of the "politics 
of inertia-that is, politics characterized by the absence of political synergy or a 
credible parliamentary alternative, and the officials' abject disregard for the con­
cerns of those they represent." 1 The 'military solution' to the Kurdish question has 
thus been responsible for the decline of democratic discourse and its replacement 
by repackaged conservative nationalist reactionism. 
The official view held by the progenitors of the military solution, the military 
establishment, suffers from two blind spots. The first entails a lack of will and 
creativity. Turkish governments have traditionally endorsed the standard military 
understanding of the fight against Kurdish terrorism as a zero-sum game. Those 
Kurdish political parties demanding a "democratic solution" while not dissociat­
ing themselves from the PKK, such as the People's Democracy Party (HADEP) 
and its present-day successor the Democratic Society Party (DTP), were not ac­
knowledged by Turkey's military and civilian leadership even when the latter were 
confronted with the necessity to rethink, discuss and review the intricacies of the 
issue and devise ways of managing it more successfully. 
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The second blind spot is a failure to make simple connections. The conflict 
with the PKK has displaced an estimated one million people from the eastern part 
of the country.2 Ironically enough, many have fled the region and sought refuge in 
slums at the outskirts of Turkey's major cities, becoming reservoirs o f  moral and 
electoral support for the Islam-friendly AK Party. 
The new democracy move by the present government seems to.carry the po­
tential for bringing fundamental conflicts and tensions within the civilian politi­
cal orbit, which would enhance the indispensable quality of civilian politicians, 
their advisers, the parliament and the government. The military-led establish­
ment forces, including the opposition party, are cognizant of the fact that switch­
ing from security-oriented and military dominated solutions to parliamentary 
decisions, civilian initiatives and imaginations can correct the power imbalance 
between civilians and the military by limiting the latter's politkal role and influ­
ence. 
The reemergence of a democratic "civilian" perspective on t!he part of the gov­
ernment represents a change in the perennial tradeoff between civilians and the 
military in Turkish politics. The AK Party's chronic "political insecurity" may have 
passed a threshold as the ruling party resurfaces as an actor taking advantage of its 
pro-European Union facet in order to shape new opportunities for restructuring 
the power balances and addressing the Kurdish question. 
Why Now? Answer: Ergenekon 
The new opportunities now available to the AK Party could hardly have emerged 
without the explosion of  the Ergenekon incident, which has offered a persuasive 
critique o f  the closed, dark, intolerant and secret communities friendly with the 
military bureaucracy and state officials but insidiously devoted to destroying the 
government. The arrests of retired four-star generals, a few active duty officers, 
prominent former politicians, journalists, academics and conservative nationalist 
activists on charges of planning to provoke the military to intervene and bring 
down the Islam-sensitive government of Turkey, commonly known as the "Er­
genekon incident:' highlights the formidable barriers to achieving a working lib­
eral democracy and 'normal' civil-military relations, but also raises the prospect 
of long-awaited change. By associating the Turkish military with the coup plot­
ters, the revelations accompanying the arrests and court trials of the Ergenekon 
actors delivered an embarrassing blow to the image that the military has favored 
for itself: that of standing 'above' narrow political interests. The immediate re­
sponse of the high command was naturally to deny any connection with the con-
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spiracy and to distance itself from the 
conspirators. Despite such statements, 
the involvement of state bureaucrats, in­
cluding military personnel, right-wing 
intellectuals and professionals in illicit 
and unconstitutional activities has cre­
ated an unprecedented opportunity for 
the government to repair and reset, more 
intentionally and intensely than ever be­
fore, the lopsided balance between civil 
and military authorities in Turkey, in 
favor of constitutionally elected organs. 
The new opportunities now 
available to the AK Party could 
hardly have emerged without 
the explosion of the Ergenekon 
incident, which has offered 
a persuasive critique of the 
closed, dark, intolerant and 
secret communities friendly 
with the military bureaucracy 
Although the uneven character of civil-military relations has long been common 
knowledge, as evidenced by continuous calls for reform by the EU since 1999, 
Ergenekon has done something more critical: it has provoked the population's 
sense of justice by what they see as an embarrassingly crude and archaic plan to 
overthrow a popularly elected government. 
As a result, within a year of the closure case crisis of the AK Party which seemed 
helpless to withstand the pressure at the time, the government now stands enabled 
to start an inquiry and a court case on the plotters of a coup against itself and to 
challenge the arch secularists and the Constitutional Court. Furthermore, the AK 
Party seems to be reengaged in new initiatives to renew its commitment to EU re­
forms and to begin a "grand negotiation" with Turkey's thus-far publicly shunned 
Kurdish leaders after decades of bloodshed. In the post-Ergenekon context, the 
new democratic opening represents a significant departure from the AK Party's 
past attempts at reform; the real issue at stake now is a redefinition of the locus 
and space in which the phenomenon of political power takes place in Turkey. The 
critical question facing the government is how to build its 'own' legitimacy that 
would allow it to formulate its 'own' clear choices free from non-civilian, undemo­
cratic constraints. 
Ergenekon's excessiveness has acted as a catalyst for the government to curtail 
its traditional impulse to simply follow along with the powerful military. It has 
raised the need to institute genuine forces and processes of democratic politics in 
Turkey in order to displace preoccupation with the futile issue of tihe dichotomy 
between secularism and Islam, which has wasted the country's energy and time 
for the last two decades. The question now is whether the AK Party can emerge 
from the Ergenekon episode newly positioned to renegotiate a robust role for it-
Is 
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as an actor taking advnntage of its pro-Europea11 Union facet in order lo shape 11ew opportunities for 
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self and articulate a new relationship between Kurdish actors and Turkish politics. 
The emergence of a popular consensus regarding the government's new, post-Er­
genekon Kurdish initiatives attests to a positive social momentum. 
Changing Conceptions of Kurdish Aspirations 
111e dominant perception among the non-Kurdish public has always been that, 
despite the appearance of a rights-based discourse, Kurdish nationalism is a terri­
tory-aspiring and divisive force challenging Turkey's political existence. 111e root 
causes for this suspicion can be found in the problematic history of the interac-
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tion between the two communities. The harshness of the armed conflict between 
the state security forces and the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) has played its part 
in reinforcing the belief that Kurdish nationalism is not a simple expression of 
discontent, but a movement that demands changing the boundaries of the Turk­
ish entity. It is also true that, in actual fact, the specter of territory-hungry Kurds 
has been instrumental for the master narrative of Turkish nationalism.3 The effect 
of Kurdish nationalism on Turkish homogeneity bears a striking parallel to the 
impact Islamic activism has on closing the ranks of secular-minded Turks. In the 
final analysis, Turkish identity remains a constitutive element in the legitimization 
of the political rule of the Republic. National integration and national security 
have become conflated and mutually reinforcing. 
In spite of this conflation, one significant dimension of the AK Party govern­
ment's Kurdish opening is its tacit subscription to the view which h_as always been 
expressed in a series of opinion surveys since 1994 · 1 - but has failed to convince 
the mainstream population - that the normative Kurdish demands do not entail 
a special status for the Kurds; on the contrary, they include a forthright emphasis 
on leveling the field to make the concept of Turkish citizenship more inclusive, 
equal, and democratic.5 When the demands revolve around cultural rights, it is 
the ethnic singularity of Kurds that emerges as the conscious object; when they 
are centered on material entitlements, social improvement and legal protection, 
the discourse is tilted toward ensuring the equality of all Turkish citizens. The EU 
has likewise tended to see the Kurdish question as a minority rights issue, and has 
therefore adopted a rights-based perspective. Thus, in the EU-anchored reform 
process, the AK Party has, since 2002, supported reforms in cultural rights in 
order to meet Copenhagen criteria as an external support in its struggle against 
the establishment. 
Even if it amounts to the celebration of cultural difference, it is clear that a 
cultural rights-based discourse can be an important strategy in achieving equality 
and justice for the Kurds in two senses: first, in eliminating the injustice of not ac­
knowledging the Kurdish identity,6 and second, in deepening Turkey's democratic 
practices and institutions for the entirety of the population. The government's 
emphasis on 'brotherly unity' between the Turks and Kurds, however, raises a 
different question, namely:7 "whether Islam provides a unity between Kurdish 
and Turkish people that supersedes ethnicity and other particularisms or, alterna­
tively, whether it sharpens nationalist consciousness by putting its weight behind 
the formation of a Kurdish identity:·a While Islam may be able to offer common 
ground, Islamic discourse in non-Kurdish and Kurdish communities has not been 
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free of ethnicity. Just as Kurdish Islamic discourse is a discourse on Kurdish iden­
tity, Turkey's Islamic movement "is also stained with the conceit of Turkish na­
tionalism."9 Even though religiosity does not necessarily translate into support for 
a Kurdish nation-state in the region, it stresses the unique characteristics of Kurds 
rather than what the government intends by its key concept of "brotherly embrace 
and unitY:' 
Over and above the fantasy of a religion-induced togetherness, there is a resur­
gence of hope for forging a new peaceful Turkey simply because Turkey is going 
through a process of "Kurdish-fatigue:' Almost any departure from the prevalent 
(even incessant) defensive discourse represented by the Prime Minister and his 
government is a welcome move-even if such a departure does not intend or pro­
duce radical changes in the established definitions of Kurdish identity. A psycho­
logical threshold has been passed, but will it bring significant change? Moreover, 
with what degree of commitment can the ruling party embrace the issue? 
The Substance of the Kurdish Initiative 
There is little to suggest that the government intends to use this context to 
generate a de facto radical shift in the civil-military balance by executing bold new 
policies regarding the Kurdish issue. In fact, the issue has always been the Achilles 
heel of the government, bringing out its conservative-nationalist support of the 
status quo. The Prime Minister's statement four years ago, on April 1 1 ,  2005 dur­
ing his state visit to Norway, showed his party's total convergence with the official 
discourse of Turkish nationalism: "We have three red lines: ethnic nationalism, 
regional nationalism, and religious nationalism . . .  there is no 'Kurdish minority' 
in TurkeY:' 10 
Despite this long-held stance, the government wishes to regain public support 
in the region and seeks to recoup the votes it lost there in the last local elections 
of March 2009. The time has also come, after a long hiatus in which the military 
solution and nationalist narratives dominated the political discourse, for the AK 
Party to satisfy the pressure of its own Kurdish deputies for new forms of response 
to the region's problems, not all of which are identity-related. The economic reces­
sion, with its substantial impact on people's lives and employment, has also played 
a part in the new move. More to the point, given the fact that several retired or 
active-duty officers stand accused of being involved in a conspiracy to overthrow 
a democratically elected and widely supported government, the AK Party believes 
it now has the opportunity to take advantage of the army's tarnished image. The 
TAF high command risks its long-term survival if it ignores the AK Party's elec-
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toral popularity or obstructs its agenda; indeed it will likely look the other way 
now so long as the new reforms leave a zone of comfort for the military to keep its 
institutional autonomy intact by, for instance, maintaining a public voice and its 
core corporate interests.1 1  
Although the substance of the Kurdish initiativ� is not absolutely clear, one 
can imagine the emerging contours of the new policy now being directed toward 
bringing peace and tranquillity to the southeast through a dedaration of some 
kind of amnesty; injecting substantial capital in the region to increase economic 
development; and significantly enhancing the existing programs of Kurdish-lan­
guage broadcasting and education. 
The general staff's strategic calculus in coping with the changing balance of 
forces is naturally based on protecting its underlying interests, goals and strengths 
after the Ergenekon storm has exposed the general fault lines of Turkey's civil­
military relations and of the internal splits within the army. At this point in time, 
hard-line elements in the military seeking to subvert the ruling party's new com­
mitment to deal with an intractable conflict in any way stand no chance of ob­
taining sufficient support from the army commanders themselves, the media, the 
public, or the international community. That said, there is no doubt that the high 
command will take this opportunity to continue influencing political outcomes by 
working to rid its own house, which is rumoured to have been infiltrated by some 
Islamic elements as well, and to restore esprit de corps. 
Where is the European Union in This? 
It is true that the new Kurdish opening is bound up with the re-emergence of 
the EU: when paid sufficient regard, the EU conditionality has once more proven 
to be an effective instrument contributing to better governance. The revival of the 
AK Party government's vision of full membership in the Union has been one of 
the central factors for the government's new engagement to introduce democratic 
policies. However, unless the EU's Copenhagen guidelines capture the imagina­
tions of political leaders and the public and result in a moral consensus, many 
features of the opening remain insecure. 
To date, the EU accession process has provided an important incentive for 
reform in Turkey. However, faltering support for Turkey's accession among some 
EU states has arguably undermined the reformists in Turkey over the last four 
years as many of Turkey's EU-related reforms have been stalled. For example, ar­
ticle 301 of the penal code, which has marred Turkey's record on �reedom-of-
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The fore�gn policy and 
international environment for 
the settlement of the Kurdish 
issue in Turkey has never been 
riper for success 
expression by punishing those who have 
"insulted Turkishness:' remains relative­
ly unchanged despite an amendment by 
the government. Meanwhile, the draft 
version of a new civilian-minded consti­
tution, meant to replace the one written 
by the military after the 1980 coup, has 
been put aside. As the AK Party's initial EU-driven agenda faltered, the military 
bureaucracy and the other secular agencies sharpened their attacks on the govern-
ment's anti-secular activities. 
From the perspective of the Turkish government, unfortunately, Turkey's 
Kurdish-fatigue coincides with a widespread Euro-fatigue. Resentment and dis­
enchantment with the EU's 'shaming' rhetoric, to which the country has been sub­
jected for a very long time, is partly responsible for xenophobia and for the revival 
of the conservative-nationalist instincts of the AK Party government. Moreover, 
the accession process is caught up in a further set of problems: although the EU 
reform agenda is critical for the reappearance of the reformist side of the AK Party 
government, in order to alter the political power balance that has sustained the 
military solution to the Kurdish problem, Ankara needs to break its pattern of 
behavior and address the Cyprus issue as well as align the civil-military relations 
with EU practices. If the government puts its mind to it, it co-uld rebuild a suffi­
ciently broad coalition on this matter too and regain legitimacy among the disil­
lusioned liberals who had supported the party in its initial days in office, when it 
moved forward forcefully on reforms and freedoms. 
Regarding the EU itself, there is no doubt that the Brussels bureaucracy needs 
to work harder to lend its strong support to the re-emergence of the AK Party by 
overcoming considerable resistance inside the bloc and fully endorse the mes­
sage that Turkish democracy matters to the EU and to the broader international 
community. Without pursuing the EU reform agenda, the AK Party will find it 
difficult to normalize civil-military relations or anything else in Turkey's domestic 
politics, even if there is consensus on issues such as the Kurdish question. 
Conclusion 
Today there is reason for cautious optimism on the domestic level, but on the 
international level, there are more realistic signs for hope on the government's 
Kurdish initiatives. The foreign policy and international environment for the set­
tlement of the Kurdish issue in Turkey has never been riper for success. 
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While the US withdrawal from Iraq has created positive momentum on the 
Kurdish issue and regional cooperation with Turkey's neighbors, Turkey's new 
self-confidence has transformed a static Cold-War bulwark into a potential cata­
lyst for regional stability. However, the Ergenekon affair, and the series of alleged 
coup plots that preceded it, have all been unprecedented enough to lead signifi­
cant segments of Turkish society to begin questioning those measures' compat­
ibility with the hallmarks of twenty-first century democracy they keep hearing, 
watching and reading about, thanks to globalization . 
Taking democratization further in an EU- and war-weary country would not 
only help stabilize Turkey's domestic politics but would enhance its regional role 
and international status. This reality should serve as a major impetus toward real­
izing the maxim of Turkey's role as a stabilizing force in one of the most unstable 
regions of the world. Turkey does not "automatically" foster stability simply be­
cause of where it is located, but should do so because of what it stands for. 
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